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Introduction
The so-called "green paradox" phenomenon refers to the fact that future, anticipated policies aiming at reducing the demand for an extracted exhaustible resource increase the present rate of extraction of that resource. Hans-Werner Sinn (2008) coined the expression, implying "that good intentions do not always breed good deeds." (page 380).
More generally, the credible threat of a "gradual greening of economic policies" (Sinn, 2008 , page 360) causes suppliers to extract their stock more rapidly. This phenomenon has receivedxx particular attention in the context of climate change economics and policies.
Fossil fuels are responsible for the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions, a pollution that has been labelled "the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-…rst century" (Stavins, 2011) . Environmental policies should attempt to slow fossil fuel exploitation. In this context, a policy entailing a green paradox would instead accelerate current and nearfuture consumption. Of major practical concern is the possibly undesired e¤ect of a lag in green policies' implementation 1 or of the expectation that green policies will be introduced gradually to be more and more stringent over time
The phenomenon is not counter-intuitive to any resource economist. Since Hotelling's (1931) seminal contribution on exhaustible resources, such commodities have been thought of as a …xed, …nite initial endowment that is to be allocated over time. A pro…t-maximizing extraction path should equalize the present-value marginal spot pro…ts of extracting at all dates. In this context, it is well-known that there exist neutral tax paths. Such paths reduce present-value marginal pro…ts in the same proportion at all dates, leaving the intertemporal arbitrage of resource producers una¤ected (Dasgupta et al., 1980) . Tax paths that are rising faster over time deteriorate the marginal pro…tability of extracting at distant dates relatively to early dates, thus leading producers to extract less of the stock in the future and to shift production to earlier dates. From Long's (1975) study, such policies can be interpreted as credible threats of future expropriation.
A "green paradox" arises when a policy is believed to distort relative marginal profitabilities in a way that penalize future extraction. Sinn argued that such a distortion not only arises from tax policies but may also result from subsidies to substitutes for the resource or from policy induced improvements in current e¢ ciency. The "green paradox"
can be described as a pure substitution between resource units extracted at di¤erent dates. In this respect, Sinn's (2008) metaphor of a closed "pneumatic system of various pipes connecting various pistons" (page 378) is illuminating: "If only one piston is pressed down, the others go up." In other words, when total cumulative supply is perfectly inelastic, demand-reducing policies only shift quantities away to other dates.
In the recent literature, authors have departed from the pneumatic metaphor by arguing that green policies may a¤ect the cumulative quantity of the resource that is to be extracted ultimately, introducing a leak in the pneumatic system: a reduction in total extraction tends to mitigate the phenomenon. In Hoel (2010) , in Gerlagh (2010) and in van der Withagen (2010, 2011) , the total quantity extracted is determined endogenously: marginal extraction costs are constant at each date in the sense that they are independent of current extraction, but depend on past cumulative extraction.
Furthermore, a substitute can be produced at some cost. Extraction stops at the date when cumulative extraction is such that the unit cost of extraction overtakes the unit cost of the substitute. Green policies aim at reducing the cost of the substitute, thus reducing the equilibrium total amount of resource extracted and increasing the part of the stock that is left unexploited. The authors show that the green paradox survives this generalization.
In this note, we formulate a simple, parcimonious, theory of resource supply that can be used to analyze the green paradox or other policy induced changes in extraction as standard supply phenomena in a general framework. We do not focus on speci…c demand reducing policies nor do we impose any restriction on their time trajectories. In a …rst part, we develop a theory of resource supply: we assume a path of producer prices to be given and we study the e¤ect of a price change. Later, we extend our results to a partial equilibrium setting where prices are endogenously determined on competitive markets so that we can focus on the e¤ect of demand-reducing policies -we might also say "green policies" although we do not deal explicitly with environmental issues. These policies can consist of any combination of taxes on the extracted resource, subsidies to substitutes for the resource, and e¢ ciency-improving policies. xx We assess the e¤ect of implementing such policies at some dates on extraction ‡ows at these dates and at other dates. When total cumulative extraction is taken as given, such policies modify the relative marginal pro…t from extracting in a clear direction and thus entail a pure intertemporal substitution e¤ect shifting extraction from the dates at which the policies are implemented to other dates. This is the essential cause of the green paradox as initially formulated.
We also do away with the Hotelling assumption of a given reserve stock. However, we don't follow Hoel (2010) , Gerlagh (2010) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010, 2011) in considering that some part of the resource may be left unexploited. Instead, we assume that the stock of reserves is made available prior xxto extraction via exploration and development; developed reserves are completely exhausted during the extraction phase, as in Gaudet and Lasserre (1988) and Fischer and Laxminarayan (2005) . However, exploration and development are sensitive to the net-of-tax rent that accrues to the extractors during the exploitation of the resource. This rent is precisely the component which is a¤ected by policies and policy changes. Consequently, the introduction of policies that a¤ect resource rents has an e¤ect on ultimate extraction through its e¤ect on exploration and development via the extraction rent. This way to endogenize the stock of resource turns out to be particularly adapted to deal with the green paradox as it allows us to separate the pure intertemporal substitution e¤ect described above from what we call the stock e¤ect of green policies. Any reduction in the resource price faced by producers, or any attempt to implement a demand-reducing policy, may cause a reduction in the ultimately exploited reserve stock. The former increases the extracted resource ‡ow at dates when policies are not implemented while the latter tends to reduce it. We show that the substitution e¤ect always dominates the stock e¤ect. Resource supply at any given date is thus increasing in the resource price at this date and decreasing in the resource prices at all other dates.
Although classical supply theory is di¤erent from classical demand theory, exhaustible resource supply has something in common with classical demand theory: resource producers allocate a stock of resource to di¤erent dates in a way that is comparable to the way consumers allocate their revenue to di¤erent expenditures. That is why combining the intertemporal substitution e¤ect and the stock e¤ect of a resource price change gives rise to an equation that is reminiscent of Slutsky's (1915) Although the parcimonious model analyzed up to this stage illustrates perfectly how the e¤ect of a price change occuring over part of the extraction period can be decomposed into a substitution e¤ect and a stock e¤ect, it does not take into account the lack of homogeneity of non-renewable resources. In reality a non-renewable resource such as oil is supplied from many heterogenous deposits with di¤erent cost of extraction and cost of exploration and development characteristics. We show how to adapt the model to such variety and show that the results are unchanged.
Revoir le planSection 2 proposes a synthetic theory of resource supply. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of a price change at a single date. Section 4 shows the general dominance of the intertemporal substitution e¤ect over the stock e¤ect. Section 5 exploits the analogy with Slutsky's decomposition equation in classical demand theory. Section 6 extends the result to price changes at a subset of dates. Section 7 extends the result to a partial equilibrium setting where we deal with the e¤ect of a change in the stringency of demand-reducing policies.
A synthetic theory of exhaustible resource supply
A quantity x t 0 of a non-renewable resource is supplied at each of a countable set of dates t = 0; 1; 2; ::: . The initial stock X of the resource is …nite and treated as exogenous at this stage, with P t 0
x t X. The producer price is denoted by p t 0. The stream of prices p (p t ) t 0 is take as given by the producers and treated as exogenously given at this stage. 2 Spot extraction pro…ts are denoted t = t (x t ; p t ), where t may be time varying, is increasing in both arguments, twice di¤erentiable, and satis…es
The stock of reserves to be exploited by a mine does not become available without some prior exploration and development e¤orts. Although exploration and exploitation 2 In Section 7, we will extend the results to a partial equilibrium setting where prices are endogenously determined on competitive markets.
3 For instance, pro…ts might write t = p t x t C t (x t ), where time-dependent total extraction cost C t (:) is a strictly convex function such that C 0 t (0) 0. often take place simultaneously (e.g. Pindyck, 1978, and Quyen, 1988 4 ), a convenient and meaningful simpli…cation consists in representing them as taking place in a sequence, as in Gaudet and Lasserre (1988) and Fischer and Laxminarayan (2005) . This way to model the supply of reserves is particularly adapted to the problem under study because it provides a simple and natural way to isolate the e¤ect of an anticipated price change on the size of the exploited stock. Speci…cally, the cost E(X) of developing an initial, exploitable stock X at date 0 is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex, and satis…es E(0) = 0 and E 0 (0) = 0. The property E 0 (0) = 0 that the marginal cost of reserves development is zero at the origin is introduced because it is su¢ cient to ensure that a positive amount of reserves is developed. It thus rules out uninteresting situations where resource prices do not warrant the production of any reserves.
For simplicity, we assume the rate r 0 at which pro…ts are discounted to be independent of time 5 .
Since the development of reserves is costly, producers' optimum plans will always bind the exhaustibility constraint. In other words, leaving part of the developed stock ultimately unexploited will never maximize pro…ts. Hence, for a given stream of prices p, the problem faced by a producer is
subject to X t 0
Denoting by the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (2), the necessary …rst-order conditions for the choice of an optimum extraction path are
and
(3) is the Hotelling rule stating that the marginal pro…t from extraction must be constant over time in present value, equal to , which is therefore the unit present-value of reserves underground, i.e. the unit Hotelling scarcity rent. (4) can be interpreted as de…ning the supply of reserves as a strictly increasing function of the unit rent:
(3) implicitly de…nes the solution x t as a function which is increasing in the current price p t and decreasing in the rent :
Combining with (2), we obtain that the rent is a function increasing in all prices p (p t ) t 0 and decreasing in the stock X:
Substituting (7) into (6) gives the conditional supply functions e x t = e x t (p; X) x t p t ; (p; X) ; : 8t 0:
Conditional on the initial reserve stock X and given prices p, these functions determine how the suppliers allocate extraction from the stock to di¤erent dates. e x t is increasing in X and decreasing in any p t 0 , t 0 6 = t. Its partial derivative with respect to p t has an ambiguous sign.
xxNow consider the choice of initial reserves, denoting by X the optimum stock of reserves at the producers'optimum given the price sequence. The value of the unit rent at the producers' optimum is = (p; X ). By (5), the optimum amount of reserves satis…es X = X( ) = X (p; X ) , which implicitly de…nes X as a function of p only:
xxThen the optimum extraction ‡ow x = (x t ) t 0 is given by the supply functions at each date:
3. Effect of a price change at a single date: Intertemporal substitution and stock effects
Let us now study the e¤ect of a change in the price at one single date, say T 0, on the resource supplies at other dates t 6 = T . From the de…nition of the supply functions (10),
we have dx t dp T = @e x t (:)
The de…nition of the conditional supply functions e x t (:) in (8) implies that the …rst term on the right-hand side is a pure substitution e¤ect, since the initial stock of reserves is kept unchanged; the substitution e¤ect measures the impact of a change in p T on the way this stock is allocated to extraction at di¤erent dates. The second term thus isolates the stock e¤ect, i.e. the e¤ect of p T on x t via the induced change in X . (11) is thus a decomposition equation, reminiscent of Slutsky decomposition equation in the classical demand theory.
As (8) makes clear, x t , t 6 = T , is only a¤ected by p T via , i.e. only to the extent that prices a¤ect the rent. Using (6), the substitution e¤ect is
which is negative. The stock e¤ect is clearly positive.
A decrease in price p T has thus two e¤ects of opposite direction on resource supply dates t 6 = T . On the one hand, it shifts resource production from date T to other dates, which tends to increase x t . On the other hand, it reduces the total cumulative extraction X, which tends to decrease supply at all dates.
As far as the e¤ect of a price change on contemporary extraction, the substitution and the stock e¤ects of a change in p T on x T are both positive: a reduction in p T causes a drop in x T . This will be very clear after the next section.
The substitution effect dominates the stock effect
Let us reconsider the two components of the e¤ect of p T on x t , t 6 = T , as given by (11).
By (12), the substitution e¤ect depends on the e¤ect of p T on the rent ; by (8), the stock e¤ect can be decomposed as
. Hence, both terms in (11) can be factorized as follows:
where the term between brackets is the total derivative of with respect to p T ; it gives the total e¤ect of a price change on the unit rent, decomposed into a direct price e¤ect at constant initial reserves, and the e¤ect on the rent of the change in initial reserves induced by the price change:
It can be shown that resource prices at all dates positively a¤ect the rent, i.e. d dp T
0
. 6 Consequently, dx t dp T = @x t (:) @ d dp T 0; 8t 6 = T;
implying that the positive stock e¤ect never more than compensates the negative substitution e¤ect. Since the e¤ect of a drop in p T is positive on total extraction and negative on supplies at all dates t 6 = T , it must be that its e¤ect is always positive on x T .
Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by the scarcity rent . In particular, it makes clear that the substitution e¤ect always overtakes the stock e¤ect because this unit rent is bound to decrease when the resource price decreases at any date. Certainly, the stock e¤ect mitigates the decrease in the rent but it does not fully compensate it.
This e¤ect of prices on the unit scarcity rent, together with the fact that a higher unit rent tends to reduce reserve supply, drives the result.
It is worth recalling here that we have assumed decreasing returns to the development of reserves -increasing marginal cost of development, i.e. strict convexity of the cost function E(X). We have argued that this assumption is necessary to take account of the …niteness of extraction prospects. In the following, we will show that this fundamental feature of exhaustible resources is essential to the result. 6 Formally, the de…nition of X 0 yields
, implying that the left-hand side of (14) can be factorized as
, which is positive since
Assume for a while that the development of reserves is subject to constant returns to scale, as would be the case for a regular, producible -non exhaustible -commodity whose total quantity X would need to be produced prior to its allocation to several alternative uses indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: . Let the marginal cost e of developing reserves be constant:
E(X) = eX. As before, is the present value of each unit of the commodity under study that the producer decides to develop at the beginning of the program, when the price trajectory becomes known. It must be that = e; it is given by the technology and insensitive to variations in prices p. Then, the quantity x t dedicated to a particular use t only depends on its own price p t . Exhaustibility is no longer relevant. The substitution e¤ect vanishes and the stock X fully absorbs any changes in x t induced by a change in
Hence, to the extend that the reserve stock can adjust to the price change, constant returns to scale in the development of X makes all cross-price e¤ects on extraction vanish, just like in the classical theory of supply under separable cost. The speci…city of resource supply results from decreasing returns in reserves development, implying that cross-price e¤ects occur -via the rent -even though extraction costs are independent from each other. The case of a Hotelling resource is extreme in that the stock of reserves is perfectly inelastic so that no stock e¤ect comes to attenuate the cross-price e¤ects.
Analogy of resource supply theory with demand theory
Although the decomposition of the e¤ects of a resource price change into a substitution e¤ect and a stock e¤ect is reminiscent of the Slutsky decomposition, resource supply is not isomorphic to demand theory. In the theory of demand, disentangling the substitution and income e¤ects requires to compensate for the level of utility: holding the objective level unchanged, the move from the consumer's optimum under the slope of the budget constraint induced by the price change represents the substitution e¤ect. In the resource supply theory, to isolate the substitution e¤ect, it is su¢ cient to hold the stock unchanged:
the exhaustibility constraint, completely determined by the level of the stock, is not modi…ed; the price change induces the form of the extraction pro…t function to change; the move to the new optimum under the initial exhaustibility constraint represents the substitution e¤ect. So, while isolating the substitution e¤ect in demand theory requires to keep the level of the objective unchanged (same iso-utility curve) and to consider the modi…ed slope of the constraint, in resource supply theory, one should take the level of the constraint unchanged and consider the modi…ed slope of the iso-pro…ts curves; unlike indi¤erence curves, isopro…t curves at di¤erent prices cross each other.
The substitution e¤ect and the stock e¤ect of a resource price change are illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of two periods, which corresponds to the two-good representation of demand theory. Assuming prices p 0 and p 1 , point A = (x 0 ; x 1 ) in Figure 1 depicts the producer optimum. The developed stock is X is determined so that producers reach the highest possible iso-pro…t curve 7 . The optimum allocation (x 0 ; x 1 ) is thus at the point of tangency between the iso-pro…t curve of level and the exhaustibility constraint which trades quantities extracted between Period 1 and Period 2 in such a way that x 0 +x 1 = X
Insert Figure 1 here
Consider now a decrease in p 1 to p 0 1 < p 1 . If the stock remains at X, since the price change implies all iso-pro…t curves to become steeper, the new tangency point is along the same exhaustibility constraint and along the iso-pro…t curve of level e < , at point e A below A , so that e x 0 > x 0 and e x 1 < x 1 . The move from A to e A represents the substitution e¤ect.
However the drop in price leads producers to reduce reserve development to X 0 . Taking this stock e¤ect into account brings the new optimum to A 0 . It is clear that x 1 > e x 1 > x 0 1 : there is no possibility of a commodity analogous to a Gi¢ n good, whose supply would increase as a result of a drop in its price. Since the total e¤ect of a price change occuring in Period 1 on Period 0's extraction is ambiguous, the graph does not a priori indicate whether x 0 0 should be greater or lower than x 0 . However our previous analysis has shown that x 0 < x 0 0 < e x 0 : there is no such thing as an inferior commodity on the supply side.
To reiterate, when the demand for one good decreases as a result of a drop in the price of another good, that is to say when the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect, those goods are said to be substitutable. On the contrary when the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect, the two goods are said to be complements. In the case of non renewable resource supply, quantities extracted at di¤erent dates are always substitutes.
6. Simultaneous price changes at a subset of dates xxJ' ai déplacé le contenu de cette section dans la suivante.
Demand related policy changes in partial equilibrium
Policy changes are more complex than the above analysis of supply for two main reasons.
First the policy related price changes usually take place over an extended period rather than at a single date; second the policy usually a¤ect prices indirectly, because they a¤ect the demand for the resource. For example the green paradox is often described as the e¤ect on current or near-future resource supply of policies reducing resource demand over some extended future period via various forms of help to alternative energy sources.
Suppose that resource demand decreases at all dates T 2 , where is a strict subset of dates. The analysis of Section 4 applies to each of the changes occuring at dates belonging to . While these changes jointly contribute to increase supply x t at all t = 2 , their e¤ect on supply at date T 2 , depends on the magnitude of the price change occuring at that date relative to the changes occuring at other dates T 0 2 . However, the analysis of Section 4 indicates that cumulative extraction over is reduced. This is because X decreases while supply at all dates t = 2 increases.
Suppose further that prices are determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand where supply is de…ned as above: taking prices p (p t ) t 0 as given, producers solve (1) subject to (2). Equations (3)- (6) hold as before. Assume that the demand for the resource at date t 0 only depends on the date, on the resource price at that date p t and on the stringency of date-t demand-reducing policies, synthesized by the index t . Formally, let demand be given by the function 8 D t (p t ; t ), continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing in both arguments. The path of policy stringency ( t ) t 0 is exogenously given. The inverse demand function P t (x t ; t ) is continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing in its two arguments.
In equilibrium, it must be thatxx x t = x t P t (x t ; t ); , where the function x t (:) is de…ned by (6). This implicitly de…nes the equilibrium quantity as a xxfunction t which is decreasing in its two arguments t and only:
The rest of the analysis follows the same steps as in Sections 2 and 3, where the exogenous indexes t will replace the formerly given prices p t . Combining (2) with (16) gives the resource rent as a function that is decreasing in all indexes and in the stock X; to simplify notation we rede…ne to be that equilibrium rent function:
Substituting (17) into (16) yields the equilibrium extraction ‡ows, conditional on the stock of reserves; xxrede…ning e x t to denote that function, we have:
Equilibrium extraction quantities are increasing in X and in t 0 , t 0 6 = t. The partial derivative of e x t (:) with respect to t has an ambiguous sign.
Denote by X e the equilibrium amount of reserves, which is also the total cumulative extraction. The unit rent in equilibrium is thus e = ( ; X e ). By (5), the equilibrium stock of reserves satis…es X e = X( e ) = X ( ; X e ) , which implicitly de…nes X e 0 as a function of only:
The equilibrium stock of initial reserves is decreasing in all t , t 0. Finally, the equilibrium extraction ‡ows x e t are determined by
the extracted resource, the price of a substitute and a subsidy to this substitute. An increase in t at any date t can thus represent a technical change, an increase in resource taxation, an increase in any substitute's subsidy or any combination of such policies that reduce the demand for the resource at given price.
Let us now assess the total e¤ect of an increase in date-T policy stringency T .
By (18), the e¤ect of a change in the stringency of a policy at T , on the equilibrium extraction quantities x e t at all dates t 6 = T , can be decomposed in (11). Remembering that a more stringent a policy reduces resource demand, the total e¤ect of an increase in stringency at T is the combination of a pure intertemporal substitution e¤ect (positive) and a stock e¤ect (negative). As before an increase in T can be shown to reduce the equilibrium rent e . From (16), T a¤ects x t , t 6 = T , only to the extent that the rent is a¤ected. Since t (:) is a decreasing function of the rent, it follows that T always a¤ects x t positively, for t 6 = T . Although more stringent demand-reducing policies at some dates result in lower total cumulative extraction (stock e¤ect), they always lead to increased equilibrium extraction ‡ows at the other dates (the substitution e¤ect dominates).
The supply of an heterogenous resource
Non-renewable resources come in a great variety of forms which di¤er by extraction costs, exploration and development costs, location, etc.. Let these various sources be identi…ed by j; j = 1; :::; J and let resource supply at date t be
where x j t 0 is the quantity of resource j supplied at date t. Spot extraction pro…ts are j t = j t (x j t ; p t ), with the same properties as in the single source case. Since x j t may be zero, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the same countable set of dates applies for all sources. Each source is constrained by its own exhaustibility constraint:
each source is characterized by its own exploration and development cost E j (X j ) whose qualitative properties are the same as in the case of a single resource, with the following minor di¤erence. The property E j0 (0) = 0 is replaced with E j0 (0) 0, so that a resource whose marginal exploration and development is too high for pro…tability need not be developed. However the same deposit that is not economic at date zero may be developed when prices become higher and/or when the technology encompassed in the functions j t (:) allows it. As before, it is supposed that exploration and development are instantanous, are undertaken only once for each deposit, and that extraction may take place only after deposit development. All potential producers face the same given price stream. For source j, the producer solves:xx
subject to (22) and to:
where j 0 is the development date for deposit j. Suppose that j > 0. No production occurs before that date, so that x t = 0; t < j . It would not be rational to develop reserves at j if it was not in order to produce immediately thereafter; consequently whether j = 0 or j > 0; x j j > 0, although nothing rules out that extraction be interrupted later on during periods of low prices. There is one speci…c resource rent j associated with each deposit. Clearly, the problems to be solved for each source are independent of each other. Thus the sole di¤erence with the one-resource case analyzed earlier is the fact that all resources need not be developed at date zero. Roughly, given a price path, resources whose extraction cost is higher and/or whose cost of exploration and development is high will be developed later.xx 9 We are interested in resource supply at dates t 0; in particular we want to determine how supply S t reacts to a change in price at T 6 = t. Since each component x j t of S t is determined independently of the others, consider deposit j in particular.
Suppose at this stage that j is given. Then the derivations and properties established in Section 2. for problem (1) can be readily adapted to problem (23). If j = 0 the solution is identical; if j > 0, x j t = 0; t < j and, for t j , the …rst-order conditions for the choice of the optimum extraction path are, instead of (3) and (4),
where the unit Hotelling scarcity rent j is evaluated at date zero, although development occurs at j rather than at zero.
The di¤erence between (24) and (3) amounts to a rede…nition of the time scale for each deposit. Subject to that adjustment, all properties of the supply functions established in Sections 2., 3., and 4. apply mutatis mutandis for all deposits. Still holding j constant, consider the e¤ect of a drop in price at date T on date t supply, where T t. All deposits developed at or before t contribute to S t . Consequently the e¤ect is the sum of the changes in the supply from all deposits such that j t T . Among them one must separate deposits i such that i = T from deposits j such that j < T . The …rst instance corresponds to the case t = T in Section 3.: a reduction in p T causes a drop in x i T . The second instance corresponds to t 6 = T in Section 4.: the substitution e¤ect dominates the stock e¤ect, so a drop in p T causes a rise in x j t . Consider the sum of all e¤ects: if t < T , a drop in p T increases extraction from all active deposits at t thus increases supply at t.
If t = T , a drop in p T reduces the contribution from all deposits, thus reduces supply at t. Now allow optimal development dates to adjust to the price change. If it is positive, the optimal development date j (p) of deposit j must be such that, . This means that production from the optimal amount of reserves is spread over time in such a way that present value marginal pro…ts are equalized and that there is no date at which production is zero while a small amount " of production would cover the resource rent cost.
10
Consider a change in the price schedule from p to p 0 where p 0 departs from p because of a drop in p T ; T > j . We know that j (p 0 ) < j (p) : Then since p is unchanged, 10 A condition similar to (27) must hold after exhaustion. We do not make use of it here. violating (27) . Hence
This implies that 8 s 2 [ j (p 0 ) ; j (p)] production from deposit is i non negative at the new price schedule p 0 while it is null at the old price schedule p.
Since this derivation applies to any deposit, we have shown that the supply from all deposits already developed at t increases as a result of a drop in price at any date T > t:
This increase in supply may involve earlier development of deposits.
